This article analyses this the possibility for firms to learn collusive solutions in a Cournot quantity game. Starting from the results of Vallée and YıldızogluËoe (2009) and of Alós-FerrerËoe(2004), we study the role of random experimenting, social learning (imitation), and (updated) memory in helping the firms to discover market configurations more collusive than the Cournot equilibrium (CE). We show that long memory and its updating by the firms is necessary for attaining such configurations.
Introduction
A recent debate between several articles (including Vriend (2000) and Arifovic and Maschek (2006) , Vallée and Yıldızoglu (2009) ) has questioned again the convergence to specific equilibria in the Cournot oligopoly game 1 , as a consequence of assumptions on the nature of the firms' learning in the game, contrasting individual and social learning. The underlying determinant of this convergence are the necessary conditions for the emergence, in the game, of an evolutionary stable equilibrium (ESE). It is now well known that, under the definition of ESE given by Maynard Smith (1982) , the convergence to a specific equilibrium in a finite population game can be quite sensitive to the specificities of the selection process, (see, for example, Ficici and Polack (2000) ).
An evolutionary process combines two basic elements: a mutation mechanism that yields the diversity in the population and a selection mechanism that favors some individuals in the population. The recent debate on individual vs social learning does, in fact, concern the nature of the selection mechanism in the evolutionary Cournot game: the distinction between the individual and the social dimensions of learning implies a distinction between the different sources of fitness taken into account by the selection mechanism: selection solely based on the individual performance, or also based on the performance of the others and, hence, on the relative performance. Only in the latter case the spite effect of Hamilton (1970) can play a role in the evolution of the strategies: would a firm adopt a strategy that increases its performance, if it even more increases the performance of the competitors? The consequences of the spite effect can only be correctly taken into account in a one-to-one game based on relative performances. Morgan and Steiglitz (2003) develop the concept of 'spiteful replicator dynamics' following such a modeling strategy: replicator dynamics are not any more only based on the comparison of the individual performance to the average performance, but also on the comparison of the relative performance of both competing individuals. They show that such a selection mechanism can yield new dynamics that differ from the ones of the standard replicator equation. For example, it becomes possible to show that the spite effect can explain why an ESE is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium in a finite population. Vallée and Yıldızoglu (2009) use the framework of the Cournot oligopoly for studying the importance of the spiteful behavior and its determinants: mutation (innovation) and imitation (selection). They show that the Walras equilibrium (WE) is quite robustly stable under general conditions, when learning is based on imitation and random experimenting (mutations) (see also Vega-Redondo (1997) ). This result stems from the spite effect that appears when learning possess a social dimension (imitation), and when dynamics are based on selection, hence on relative performance of firms. Using Genetic Algorithms (GA), they show that, when the GA represents social learning, the convergence can only occur to WE. In the case of individual learning, the convergence to Cournot equilibrium (CE) is only possible if the interactions of the firms allow them to discover the decreasing relationship between the market price and their quantities. This is, for example, impossible with a learning based on hypothetical profits (as considered by Arifovic and Maaschek (2006) ).
These results clarify the conditions of convergence to equilibria under imitation and mutation based learning. One of the shortcomings of this learning mechanism is the absence of memory. In fact, we could not even assimilate the mutation based learning to a 'trial and error' process, because the agents cannot compare the performance obtained through the experiment with their previous result, and decide if the trial corresponds to an error or not. To be able to make this comparison, they must possess at least a one period memory on their previous strategy and performance.
Starting from this observation, other recent articles extend the initial model of Vega-Redondo (1997) by assuming that agents can keep in memory the past strategies and corresponding performances. Alós-Ferrer (2004) considers a collective memory by assuming that agents can imitate past best strategies of the industry (composing the set that contains, for each period, the strategies that gave the highest profits to firms). He shows that the learning process will converge, under this assumption, to any symmetrical quantity vector with q j ∈ q CE , q W E . Bergin and Bernhardt (2004) show, on the other hand, that learning with individual memory imply convergence to CE. These results indicate that the only absorbing states of the learning dynamics with memory are q CE , q W E . It is interesting to notice that these conclusions are not always confirmed by the experiments on Cournot oligopoly. The results of Huck, Normann, Oechssler (1999) and of Apesteguia, Huck, Oechssler (2007) conform with these conclusions (convergence to CE or WE as a function of the information given to the players). But, the initial oligopoly experiments of Fouraker and Siegel (1963) and later ones of Offerman, Potters, Sonnemans (2002) observe more collusive quantities than CE and, even the convergence towards the collusive solution (CS). In these last experiments, the informational conditions and the possibility of memorizing past observations plays an important role in the possibility to beat the CE.
We can consequently ask if other solutions can also be attained under alternative assumptions about the learning of the firms with memory. One important point in the use of the memory is the selection rule that is used by the players, when the same quantity appears in the memory with profits obtained in different periods. Alós-Ferrer adopts an imitate the best rule, and the player bases her decision of the highest profit corresponding to this quantity when she compares it with other quantities in the memory. Moreover, when the memory is collective, there is a confusion between imitation and memory (since the player can adopt, from the memory, strategies belonging to other firms). Now, we know that imitation imposes a strong pressure on the strategies of the firms towards the Walrasian equilibrium, even if the memory introduces a best reply orientation on the selection of strategies, through the trial and error process. The tension between these forces drives learning towards any symmetric solution between q CE , q W E . It is necessary to check if under alternative assumptions on memory, convergence to other solutions is possible. Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2004) show that in the absence of imitation, with an individual learning based on a pure trial and error process, the only absorbing state is the collusive solution. To obtain the trial and error process and the corresponding results, memory is necessary again, but it is individual in this case. The absence of imitation (social learning yielding the spite effect) eliminates the tension towards WE and the system can converge below CE. Using again a discrete strategy space, but a different learning mechanism (Q-learning), Waltman and Kaymak (2008) show that the agents can converge towards more collusive solutions than CE. Q-learning is a mechanism that includes implicit individual memory (the strategies are selected on the base of the average of their past performances)
2 . These sets of results point to the importance of individual memory, with some updating mechanism for the performances of the strategies in the memory, as an important mechanism for the convergence to more collusive solutions. Our results below will aim to clarify these mechanisms in a more general setup with continuous strategies.
In this article, we use computational experiments with a continuous strategy space to show that:
• Under the original assumptions of Alós-Ferrer with collective memory, the convergence is towards WE.
• If we allow the updating of the profits associated with the quantities in the collective memory using the most recent observations, the results of Alós-Ferrer are conserved. Hence, updating is not sufficient for deviating from WE under collective memory
• If the firms can only benefit from an individual memory, the convergence to the CE is observed in accordance with Bergin and Bernhardt (2004) .
• Convergence to more collusive solutions, in conformance with the experiments, can be observed only with individual memory, when the memory is updated with most recent observations. It is hence possible, for the firms, to beat the CE.
We also formalize the mechanisms that are behind these results and check the validity of our intuitions through a finer analysis of the simulation results.
The article is organized as following. The first section presents the framework of our analysis (the model, the equilibria and the simulation protocol). The main simulation results are discussed in the second section. The third section is dedicated to the formalization of the mechanisms driving these results. The results of this section are confronted with a finer analysis of the simulation results in the fourth section and the last section concludes the article.
Experimental setup and protocol
In section, we first present a general Cournot oligopoly game and its equilibria. Learning of the agents will be introduced in a second paragraph. At a last point, we will summarize the simulation protocol.
A simple oligopoly game
We consider a standard symmetrical n−firms oligopoly model of quantity competition where all firms produce a homogeneous product. The inverse demand function for this good is given by p = p (Q) , where Q = n i=1 q i and dp/dQ < 0. The common cost function of the firms is C (q i ) , with C > 0 and C > 0. The profit function of a firm is:
Since the interaction between the strategies (quantities) of the firms only takes place through the common inverse demand function (and hence, through the sum of these quantities), a quantity profile (q 1 , . . . , q n ) can be represented, from the point of view of a firm i, as (q i , Q −i ) , where
In this oligopoly, three different solutions can be defined: the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (CE), the Walrasian equilibrium (WE) and the Collective solution (CS).
Definition 1 A Cournot-Nash equilibrium (CE) is given by a quantity profile q CE and a market price p CE such as 1. Each firm maximizes its profit at this equilibrium
2. The market clears:
Definition 2 A Walrasian equilibrium (WE) is given by a quantity profile q W E and a market price p W E such as 1. Each firm uses marginal cost pricing (it is a price-taker)
2. The market clears :
Definition 3 A Collusive solution (CS) is given by a quantity profile q CS and a market price p CS such as
Since dp/dQ < 0 and C > 0, the conditions (1), (2) and (3) imply the standard results on the comparison of these solutions:
The collusive solution pareto-dominates other solutions for the firms.
Learning of the agents
The mechanisms that we consider for the learning of the agents cover the ones discussed in the introduction: random experiments, imitation of the others, collective or individual memory and the possibility of updating the memory. The firm can learn from others (imitation) or from the memory (collective/individual). It can also benefit from random experiments, which are the starting point of our presentation.
Random experiments
In each period, with a probability p m , the quantity of each firm is perturbed using a truncated normal draw from N (q, σ) constrained to the interval q CS (1 − β) , q W E (1 + β) . This interval contains all potential solutions of the Cournot game.
Imitation
In each period, with a probability p I , each firm can imitate the best strategy in the actual population:
Memory and updating
The memory contains observations (q, π) for the last K periods (size of the memory). When the memory is collective, it contains best strategies observed in each past period. When the memory is individual, the values come only from the observations of each firm (q i , π i ) . When the update is possible, the data in the memory q 0 , π 0 τ is replaced by q 0 , π 0 t when the firm reuses the quantity q 0 in a period t > τ . In each period, each firm can use memory with a probability p M . When the imitations is also present, the firm adopts the best strategy between imitation and the memory.
Random experiments take place after imitation and memory.
Simulation protocol
We use the standard quadratic cost Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and quadratic costs:
In the experiments, we adopt the following numerical specification and the corresponding symmetric solutions: n = 10 firms, a = 256, b = 1, d = 1, c = 56
In order to analyze the convergence of the learning dynamics, and the role of different learning parameters in this convergence, we run Monte Carlo simulations with 500 runs of 10000 periods for each configuration, where we randomly draw these parameters in each run:
• the probability of imitation,
• the probability of mutation,
• the probability of using the memory,
• the size of the memory of the firms;
We give in Appendix A.1 the numerical specification of other parameters of the model used in the simulations.
At the end of each run, we record the last period values of the relevant variables (market price, quantities, variance of quantities, etc.) and we compare these values with the theoretical values of the potential solutions given above. We use standard statistical techniques (plots, econometrics, regression trees and statistical tests) to establish our results and the influence of the parameters. All statistical tests are conducted using R-Project 2.8.1.
Computational results
We successively check the convergence under different assumptions about the learning of firms. For only social imitation and mutation based learning, the results of Vallée and Yildizoglu (2009) directly apply and we do not reproduce them here. This type of learning systematically converges to WE in accordance with the theoretical literature and because of the spite effect that appears in this context: a firm deviating from the WE, in the direction of CE, increases its profit but it increases even more the profits of firms who remained on the WE and the imitation pulls the population back to this equilibrium. For the CE, we have the contrary result: a firm deviating from CE to WE decreases its profits but it decreases even more the profits of other firms and they will imitate it and migrate towards WE. This mechanism is very robust in theoretical terms, and imitation is a strong force that pushes the firms towards higher quantities. We consequently begin our analysis with the test of the results from Alós-Ferrer (2004) (AF henceforth). We summarize here the main computational results. The following two sections will explore the mechanisms that drive these results. 2.1 Convergence with collective memory Alós-Ferrer (2004) proves, with discrete strategies and collective memory, that the absorbing states correspond to the interval [CE, W E]. Our results with continuous strategies, given in Figure 1 mainly confirm this conclusion (Graph (b)), but with a clearly higher rate of convergence to WE. In a very significant proportion of the runs, the strategies have converged towards the WE, since the variance of the quantities is very small (Graph (a)) and the resulting market price is p W E . But, we also observe a convergence to above this interval in some marginal cases.
Result 1 Convergence is observed even we keep the mutations during whole history: the variance of the quantities of the firms are very small ( Figure 1 -(a)).
Result 2 Convergence is mainly onto the WE price, and also on prices between p W E and p CE , but only in 46% of the cases. We even observe convergence on prices above p CE in 4.4% of the cases. As a consequence, our results do not strictly confirm the main result of AF. (Figure 1-(b) ).
Which forces drive up the firms from the WE, towards higher prices? In order to check this, we proceed with a probit estimation for the probability of observing p > p W E in our data. Following the standard convention about the significance of the explanatory variables (for α : * = 0.1, * * = 0.05, * * * = 0.01, * * * * = 0.001), we show that a weaker imitation is the main driving force. This result confirms the very robust role of the spite effect in the convergence towards WE.
Result 3 The probability of attaining prices higher than the WE price is increasing with the size of the memory ( * * ) and the probability of using memory ( * * * * ), decreasing with the probability of mutation ( * * * * ) and the size of the mutations ( * * ). The probability of attaining prices higher than the CE price (p > p CE ) only depends on the size of the memory ( * * * * ), and the influence is positive.
Result 4 The probability of having a final market price that does not verify the result of AF is increasing with the probability of mutation ( * * * * ) and the size of the mutations ( * * ), and decreasing with the probability of using the memory ( * * * * ).
Individual memory
When each agent is able to keep an individual memory of the past strategies, Bergin and Bernhardt (2004, p.449 ) asserts that the industry should converge on the CE, when the strategy space is continuous, the inverse demand function is linear and the cost function is strictly convex (our experiment complies with all these conditions).
The results indeed change significantly in comparison with the preceding case, but we do not observe a convergence towards the CE (Figure 2) . A very large majority of cases 99% ends with a market price higher than the p CE : The firms are able to attain more collusive solutions.
Result 5 Convergence is weaker with individual memory: the variances of the quantities of the firms are quite significant in the majority of the simulations (Figure 2-(a) ).
The absence of convergence can be observed in Figure 3 where we represent the distribution of the variances of quantities in the last 50 periods, every 10 periods. We do not observe a significant decrease in the variances with the passage of time. Moreover, this non-convergence is quite robust and we continue to observe it even if we let the simulations run 10000 periods. Result 6 The industry is able to discover the CE and even more collusive solutions (in 99% of the cases (Figure 2-(b) ). This case is quite different from the original AF case. Only in 1% of the cases the convergence is onto the region between the WE and CE prices.
These results are clearly in contradiction with Bergin and Bernhardt (2004) . The observed average price is clearly higher than p CE , and Student's t-test rejects the null-hypotheses H 0 :
Least square analysis of the determinants of the market price, in this case, gives the following results (for α we have * = 0.1, * * = 0.05, * * * = 0.01, * * * * = 0.001):
Result 7 The final market price is decreasing with the probability of using the memory ( * * ), and with the probability of mutation ( * * * * ).
A standard source of convergence in evolutionary learning is imitation that favours the diffusion of successful strategies in the population (cf. Vallée and Yildizoglu (2009) ). Since pure individual memory does not assure convergence, we can check if this mechanism can allow firms to coordinate their production levels. 
Convergence with individual memory and imitation
We complete the preceding market setup by giving to the firms an opportunity of imitating the quantities of their competitors. We introduce this possibility in a very simple and usual way (see above): In each period, each firm is given, with a probability p I , the possibility of imitating the quantity of the competitor with the highest profit in the preceding period. This possibility introduces a restricted collective memory in the individual learning of the firms, and it should make easier the coordination of the firms. (2009), and discussed below, imitation is a very strong source of spite effect and it pushes the firms toward the WE. Hence, the convergence comes with a cost, firms have lower profits than with individual learning. Figure 5 shows that the convergence is stronger with higher probabilities of imitation (the variances are clearly decreasing in the right graphic), but the market price is compressed toward the WE price in the same time: the convergence takes place on lower prices and it yields lower profits for the firms. Hence imitation of each other cannot allow the firms to consistently beat the CE. Another learning mechanism is necessary for observing this outcome: the updating of the individual memory.
Beating the CE: Convergence with individual memory and updating
A new result emerges when firms can also update the performances in the memory, by substituting to the old profits associated with each quantity, the profit observed the last time they have used this quantity: a convergence towards more collusive solutions ( Figure 6 ). Firms can only advance in the direction of the Pareto optimum (CS) by discovering that they must refrain from playing their best response against lower quantities of their competitors. This is only possible if the memory is long enough, since the temptation to play the best response is very strong. Even in this case, this effect is, at the end, neutralized by the best reply effect and firms stop before attaining CS.
The updating of the memory nevertheless displaces the zone of convergence in order to cover also a subset of p CE , p CS .
Result 8 Convergence: the variances of the quantities of the firms are considerably smaller than in the preceding cases ( Figure 6-(a) ). In many cases, the firms do converge to a unique production level.
Result 9
The convergence is not toward a unique market solution. We also observe that the industry can robustly convergence towards prices higher than the CE price in this case (in 95% of the cases, Figure 6 -(b)).
We can check if the cases with prices higher than p CE do effectively correspond to more collusive situations. Figure 7 gives the profits of the firms in these cases, and we observe that the distribution of the quantities also perfectly corresponds to more collusive situations and to profits higher than the CE profits. Consequently firms can attain more collusive situations under individual learning with updating. How is this result possible? To answer this question, we now analytically explore the mechanisms that drive these results.
Theoretical analysis of the learning mechanisms
In order to better understand the general mechanisms that are behind our new results with individual memory and update, we first analyze these forces in a simple, two players, one mutation per period, version of the oligopoly game. We also consider below the impact of higher numbers of players and of mutations. If we assume that firms start from an initial symmetric point (q, q) and if they have the possibility of deviating, from this initial allocation, with a given perturbation , in both direction, their situation can be schematically represented by the corresponding 3 × 3 normal form game given in Table 1 . The structure of the game depends on the order that exists between the pay-offs A, B, C, . . .The nature of the initial allocation (q, q) will determine this order. The relevant pay-offs in the simple game analyzed in this article are given in Appendix A.2. For example, if initially q = q CE , and assuming that > 0 is sufficiently small to have q − ≥ q CS and q + ≤ q W E , the following inequalities would hold:
• G > F and G > I : (q CE , q CE ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Distribution of the average profits
Average profits • E > A > G > F and G > I > H > D : first, CE is the unique Nash equilibrium and, second, the best reply dynamics will necessarily imply a movement from (q − , q − ) (e.g. CS) and from (q + , q + ) (e.g. WE) towards CE.
Using the structure of this matrix, we can analyze the impacts of different learning mechanisms (memory, imitation, random experiments). We focus in the next sections on three mechanisms: mutation, imitation and individual memory with or without update. We will discuss mainly the effects of these mechanisms in the zone [q CS , q CE ] since our new results concern the convergence in this interval.
Pure evolutionary social learning: experimenting and imitation
Consider that, at every period, the strategies can be perturbed (random experimenting), and that each firm can imitate another one, on the basis of the last period performance of this competitor. Figure 8 represents the forces of convergence that can be impulsed by these two simple mechanisms. Notice that the imitation force can only play in an initially asymmetric state, and in this case, it necessarily point towards CE since, when q ∈ [q CS , q CE ], we necessarily have Figure 8 shows that the direction of learning is towards (q CE , q CE ), if the probability of imitation is not zero, and, symmetrically, starting from (q CE , q CE ), these forces push the learning process towards (q W E , q W E ). We generalize these results in the following proposition. Proposition 4 Imitation will favor the increase of the quantities, if the initial state before mutation corresponds to q > q W E + 2 > q CE .
Proof. The strategy population will evolve towards lower quantities if the initial state favors the imitations of any individual mutation from q to q − , and forbids the imitation of an individual mutation from q to q + . These properties are observed if the initial allocation, q, respects to the following two conditions:
One can easily check that Condition ((5)) requires that q > q W E + 2 while Condition ( (6)) requires that q > q W E − 2 . In the interval [q CS , q CE ], both conditions are false and the corresponding forces increase the quantites towards q CE .
We summarize the effects of these mechanisms in Figure 9 that represents the forces that result from imitation and random experiments. These forces directly stem from Proposition 4. We represent in this figure how these forces play as a function of the initial quantity q and the mutation . The conditions ((5) − (6)) divide the quantity space in three zones.
In Zone III, we have F > E and H > I. Any mutation from q to q − will hence be imitated, while any move from q to q + will not. In Zone I, we have F < E and H < I, and only a mutation from q to q + will be imitated. Finally, in Zone II we have two opposing forces. But, if WE is reached, any mutation from q W E to q W E − will leave Zone II, since its width is . Once in Zone I, because of Proposition 4, imitation will push the quantities towards Zone II (given that we have A > G, a lower collective quantity is associated with lower pay-offs, while, G > D implies that a higher collective quantity is associated with lower pay-offs).
A direct consequence of Figure 9 is that imitation will enforce stabilization around the Walrasian equilibrium: the set of the absorbing states is Zone II and convergence to WE will be observed when → 0.
Experimenting and short individual memory (K = 1)
We now consider that agents are able to recall their last strategy and its performance. We have an individual memory of size K = 1. The agents are now fully able to benefit from a trial and
Condition H > I: Figure 10 . The impact of memory depends both on the probability of using the memory, and on the previous state of the population. Consequently, we represent transitions that are possible with memory, only if the previous state makes them possible. First, with a memory of size one, the information concerning the strategy q CE (resp. q CS ) will evaporate if the strategy q CS (resp. q CE ) has been used in the last period. Second, a move from (q CS ,q CS ) to an asymmetric state cannot result from the use of memory, if the previous state was (q CE ,q CE ), followed by double simultaneous mutations. Because A > G, memory will incite the firms to switch back to (q CS , q CS ). Leaving (q CS , q CS ) thanks to memory is only possible, if the previous state was asymmetric. Figure 10 indicates that using a memory of size one will encourage the convergence towards (q CE , q CE ), if the probability of using the memory is not zero. A similar reasoning can be used to show that, starting from (q W E , q W E ), the learning process converges towards (q CE , q CE ). The following proposition generalizes this result.
Proposition 5 An individual memory of size one will favor moves towards the CE, if q >
, the individual memory stirs any mutant to come back to CE after the mutation.
Proof. With an individual memory of size one, the mutant firm will compare its actual pay-off with the pay-off before mutation (trial and error). Starting from any production level q, this mutant will move towards the q − , if its pay-off is increasing by unilaterally decreasing its production and, if its pay-off is decreasing by unilaterally increasing its production. So, the memory will stir it to stay at q if and only if the two following conditions hold:
It is easy to check that Condition (7) requires q > q
, while Condition (8) requires
. Figure 11 represents these result. In Zone I, since we have F < G and G < I, there is no incentive to reduce production and any increase of production will be kept as a good solution in the memory. In Zone III, we have F > G and G > I. This is the opposite case of Zone I: there is no incentive to increase the production, and any decrease will be kept as a good solution in the memory. In Zone II, we have both F < G and I < G, which is equivalent to the standard Nash equilibrium conditions. Any increase of widens the zone and, any deviation of size will put the quantity outside of the Zone II, since its width is 2
< . But then, memory will incite to switch back to this area.
Condition F > G:
Condition G > I: We now consider the case of a longer memory.
Experimenting and long memory (K > 1) with updating
What are the consequences of a higher memory size ? A direct consequence is that any strategy q i may appear in the memory with different valorizations. In our example, q CS can both appear with profits π i (q CS , q CS ) = A and π i (q CS , q CE ) = F . Moreover, if the memory is very long, some of the performances can correspond to a very old state of the population and induce ill adapted decisions for the actual state. These problems can be avoided if the agents can update the memory, in such a way that only the most recent information is associated to each strategy.
Our simulation results prove that only such an update can yield more collusive states that are statistically significant.
We can underline a condition that is necessary, but not sufficient, in order to move towards collusive solutions using a long memory. To move from (q, q) to (q− , q− ) will require at least two moves, either the transition (q, q)
As a consequence, in order to compare results (payoffs) of the initial situation π i (q, q) and of the final situation π i (q − , q − ), one must have a sufficiently long memory. This long memory facilitates a move towards the collusive situation, since, if it has been reached in the past, the agents can remember for a long time that it was a favorable situation, also from an individual point of view. This would incite the agent to come back to more collusive quantities.
Proposition 6 If the memory is long enough, a necessary condition for the memory to push the quantities towards the collusive solution is q > q CS + 2 .
Proof. We need to check that there exists a diagonal convergence D G → A that lowers the quantities. We need to check under which conditions on initial quantities q we can observe A > G and G > D for both players, and, since the game is symmetric, the initial quantity must be compatible with following two conditions:
It is easy to check that Condition (9) requires q > q CS + 2 , while Condition (10) requires Figure 12 highlights these results. In Zone I, we always have A < G and G < D. Consequently, since the lowest quantities are associated in the memory to the lowest pay-offs, there is an incentive to leave this area by increasing the quantities. In Zone III, since A > G and G > D, any collective decrease of quantities is associated with higher payoffs. This creates an incentive to collectively move towards the area II. In Zone II the mechanisms are again more intricate. Given that A < G in this zone, a lower collective quantity is associated with lower pay-offs, while, because of G > D, a higher collective quantity is associated with lower pay-offs. Notice that the width of area II is , so again, any mutation will leave this area.
Condition G > D: 
Three main forces: a synthesis
The forces and mechanisms that drive the learning dynamics in accordance with of Propositions 5-6 are summarized in Figure 13 . Whether or not the learning dynamics will converge towards a particular equilibrium will depend on the relative strength of these forces. With a short memory and a systematic use of imitation, convergence to WE must be observed. With a long memory, and a very rare use of imitation, firms may overcome WE and CE, and converge on a more collusive solution. But, we observe that these forces will not allow firms to fully attain the CS solution. In fact, it is not possible for the firms to stabilize on quantities below q CS + 2 > q CS , since all forces but long memory clearly favor higher quantities below this threshold. 
Increasing the number of players and updating
Recall that, if there is only one mutation per period, a move from (q, q) to (q − , q − ) will require at least two moves, that is either the transition (q, q)
As a consequence we can easily demonstrate the next proposition.
Proposition 7 In a two player game, a long memory by itself cannot allow convergence towards collusive equilibrium.
Proof. Let first assume that only one mutation per period is possible. In order to converge on, and to stay at, the collusive equilibrium, the following conditions must be satisfied:
• A > G: there exists a diagonal convergence (through imitation).
• A > E and F > G: there exists an individual incentive to move towards q − (Condition F > G) and no incentive to return to q (Condition A > E). If A > E the updated memory will contain, for the strategy q, a profit equal to E, which will be lower than the profit associated to the strategy q − , A. This will stabilize decreasing quantities towards q CS .
These two conditions are satisfied if q > q
.
Assume now that the oligopoly is composed of more than 2 (n > 2) . Would that significantly change our results? If yes, can we qualify the impact of increasing n? The impact would indeed be quite strong. Mainly, the game would lose its "symmetry" in this case. To illustrate this dimension of the problem, let consider a three players game, in which, at a given period, two firms mutate from q to q − , while the third one sticks to this initial quantity. The total quantity becomes 3q − 2 . The game, from the point of view of the non mutant firm, is equivalent to a 2-players game where the other firm is twice bigger. We know, from Proposition 7, that in a two players symmetric game the mutant firm m will not reduce its
. In a n-players asymmetric game, this condition must be modified, and it now depends of the number of mutants. Let define by π i (q i , n m , q) the profit of firm i when playing q i , given that n m firms are also playing q i , and n − n m − 1 firms are playing q. Hence, in a 3-players game, if two firms are doing the same move, from q to q − , the new profit of each mutant firm i is π i (q − , 1, q), while the profit of the non mutant firm j is π j (q, 0, q − ). Using these definitions, we can now announce a proposition that considers the convergence to CS in this case.
Proposition 8 When multiple mutations are allowed, a long memory by itself can efficiently permit the convergence towards a more collusive solution than the CE, but the industry cannot attain the CS.
Proof. We need to verify the following conditions:
These conditions are individually satisfied if:
• A > E : =⇒ q > a − c + (bn + d) b + bn + bn 1 + 2d . 
,
, one can check that if n 1 > 0 and n ≥ 3 we have q CS <q < q CE . Also, for a given n 1 , lim n→∞q = ≥ lim n→∞ q CS = 0. As a consequence, Conditions (1-3) can necessarily be satified in the interval q CS , q CE , but not when the industry becomes very close to CS.
Figures (14 − 16) show the evolution ofq for n 1 = 0 (only individual mutation), n 1 = 1 (double mutations) and n 1 = n − 2 (all the firms minus one mutate) with 3 ≤ n ≤ 10. We observe thatq decreases with n, but it remains indeed in the interval q CS , q CE , and never passes below q CS .
Confrontation of intuitions with experiments
We present in this section new results in order to confirm the role of the mechanisms discussed in the preceding section, in the global convergence results we have observed in Section 2. We also introduce supplementary experiments inspired by these theoretical results.
Convergence to collusive solutions
Is the memory the main driving force of the results of Section 2? Figure 17 displays the distribution of prices as a function of different learning mechanisms. The horizontal lines indicate p W E < p CE < p CS . The positive role played by the probability of using memory (a), and by its size (b) clearly appear on these graphs. When the memory is very frequently used p M ∈ ]0.89, 1] , around 75% of the observations correspond to prices higher than the CE price, which is a significant convergence result towards prices more collusive than the CE. The negative impact of imitation is also clearly shown in graph (d). When p I is very low, more than 75% of q CE q CSq Figure 16 : Conditions when n 1 = n − 2, that is 2 mutants per period if n = 3 and 9 if n = 10 , for n ∈ [3, 10]
the cases converge to more collusive prices. Graph (c) shows that experimentation is necessary, but not alone sufficient for securing convergence towards collusive prices. These results can be confirmed using a basic econometric analysis. The probit analysis of the probability of converging to a price higher than p CE confirms the role played by the memory and its size (all factors significative for α = 0.001):
Result 10 The probability of converging to a solution above the CE price is increasing with the probability of mutation, the probability of using the memory and the size of the memory. It is decreasing with the probability of imitation, and the size of the mutations. Memory and its size definitely play an important role in the capacity of firms to attain prices above the CE price.
The regression tree 3 of Figure 18 gives some quantitative insights on the conditions of convergence towards a price above p CE , and on the interactions of different mechanisms. The configurations in which the expected price is the highest are observed following the most right branches of the tree (we have E[p] = 115 in these cases). They correspond to the following simultaneous conditions: p I < 0.006408, K < 6. On the right part of the tree, when p I ≥ 0.02153, the highest expected price (E[p] = 103.6 > p CE ) is observed when K ≥ 6, p M ≥ 0.4982, p m ≥ 0.03607, where renadom experiments and memorymust compensate the negative effects of higher imitation.
Role of the memory size
We analyze here the role of the memory size with different numbers of firms. For this analysis, we run 3000 simulations of 1000 periods, where we have also randomized the number of firms: n ∈ [2, 5]. When we change the number of firms, the equilibrium prices changes, as well as the distance between them. Figure 19 shows the distribution of the market prices for different number of firms, and memory sizes. Figure 18 : Determinants of the market price robustly attain prices higher than p CE . Especially, K = 1 becomes particularly inefficient when n ≥ 4. Only the two highest memory sizes warrant a convergence over CE in more than 75% of cases in all situations.
Conclusion
We have analyzed, in this article, the possibility for firms to learn collusive solutions in a Cournot quantity game. Starting from the results of Vallée and Yıldızoglu (2009) and of Alós-Ferrer (2004) , we study the role of random experimenting, social learning (imitation), and memory in helping the firms to discover market configurations more collusive than the Cournot equilibrium (CE). We show that long memory and its updating by the firms is necessary for attaining such configurations.
In a first step, we show this results using direct computational experiments. These experiments clearly emphasize the necessity of the memory updating for beating the CE. We clarify the mechanisms that are behind this global result, through an analytical exercise that establishes the conditions under which different components of the firms' learning can orient the convergence to solutions in the CE. This analysis indicate that it is possible for the firms to convergence towards more collusive solutions, without being able to fullt converge on the collusive solution (CS). Their capacity to beat the CE decreases when their number increases, which could seem to be an unsurprising result, but, here, this result is explained as resulting from the difficulty, for them, of discovering the CS in a system with a richer set of states. The supplementary simulations introduced in the last section of the article show that convergence to more collusive solutions becomes nearly impossible for the firms, as soon as their numbers is equal to five. The econometric and statistical analysis of the results indicate that the probability of converging to market prices higher then the CE price is decreasing with the probability of imitation, and increasing with the probabilities of mutation and using memory, and with memory size. The first part of these conclusions confirms the force imposed, on the firms by the social learning, towards the Walrasian solution, while the last parts establish the necessity of exploration and updated memory for collusion. 
